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ABSTRACT: In recent years the question of whether lawyers have a general ethical 
obligation to serve a gatekeeping function has been raised in a number of 
legal contexts.  The reaction of the practicing bar generally has been 
unenthusiastic.  While asserting that a gatekeeping function should be 
generally applicable to all attorneys is a relatively recent stance, such an 
obligation historically has been acknowledged to various degrees in 
several specific practice areas, including particularly in the field of 
federal income taxation.  This piece examines the gatekeeping question, 
and how the practicing bar should react to it, through an examination of 
the gatekeeping role historically asserted as applicable to tax lawyers, 
including how modern pressures (e.g., literalist statutory interpretation, 
profit maximization law firm models, changing business and societal 
ethical norms, etc.) have altered that historically asserted ethical norm.  
The article then suggests avenues for combating these modern trends in 
the tax arena in order to strengthen and reestablish the historic balance in 
a tax lawyer’s planning role (e.g., by creating intentional conflicts of 
interest to create a “divide and conquer” dynamic between clients and 
attorneys in aggressive transactions, emphasizing the ethical training of 
tax attorneys, clarifying the proper approach for statutory interpretation 
in the tax context, creating disincentives for a legal race to the bottom 
among attorneys competing for business, highlighting the importance of 
individual trend setters, channeling the competitive pressures in the legal 
marketplace in the government’s favor, etc.).  The piece concludes with 
some closing thoughts regarding the lessons that the practicing bar might 
take from the tax gatekeeping example in their future reactions to 
gatekeeping initiatives in other areas of the law and accepting 
gatekeeping as a generally applicable ethical norm.  
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“And the LORD said unto Cain, Where is Abel thy brother? And he said, I know not: Am I my 
brother’s keeper?” 1 
 
I. Introduction 
The essence of the relationship between a lawyer and a client traditionally has 
been that of a zealous advocate.  As Lord Henry Brougham famously stated: 
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in 
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all 
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other 
persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; 
and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the 
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. 
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must 
go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his 
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.2 [Emphasis 
added.] 
In modern times Lord Brougham’s admonition that a lawyer should not consider the societal 
consequences of zealously defending a client has been questioned.3  More recently, some have 
gone even farther and questioned whether lawyers generally have an affirmative obligation to act 
                                                 
1
 GENESIS 4:9.   
2
 2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821).  To understanding the full import of the 
emphasized language it is necessary to place Lord Brougham’s statement in its historical context.  
Queen Caroline was popular with the masses but had been charged with adultery.  However, her 
husband King George IV also had a secret indiscretion.  While he was heir-apparent, the King 
had secretly married a Catholic.  If this fact became known, the King would have lost his own 
title pursuant to the Law of Settlement.  The quoted language was part of Lord Brougham’s 
opening statement in defense of Queen Caroline and represented a direct threat that Lord 
Brougham would not hesitate to produce this evidence against the King if required to defend his 
client, no matter the resulting confusion and tumult to the country.  Monroe H. Freedman, Henry 
Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1213, 1215 (2006).    
3
 See, e.g., William Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29 (1978); David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 
(1988); Deborah Rhode, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
(2000); Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
  
as gatekeepers safeguarding the structure and purpose of the law.4  Indeed, in the realm of the 
securities laws, Congress and the Securities Exchange Commission have moved to require 
lawyers to assume a pro-active gatekeeping role in policing their clients’ actions via legislation,5 
regulations6 and prosecutions.7 
While the idea that gatekeeping is a general obligation of all lawyers is relatively 
new, the tax bar in the United States has been debating whether it has a special gatekeeping 
obligation almost since the inception of the income tax.8  Over most of the modern income tax 
era the prevailing view of commentators has been that the unique nature of the tax system 
requires tax lawyers to have an ethical obligation to create, nurture and promote a fair tax 
                                                 
4
 See e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006); Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. 
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 
NW. U.L. REV. 1167 (2005).  The gatekeeping role envisioned in these works goes well beyond 
the traditionally accepted notion that a lawyer is an “officer of the court” and therefore cannot 
knowingly make false statements to a tribunal, fail to disclose controlling adverse authority, etc.  
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 and associated comment.  
5
 See e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) § 307, 15 
U.S.C. § 7245 (2002) (directing the SEC to adopt certain rules of minimum professional conduct 
for attorneys) and § 602(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d- 3(a) (2002) (allowing administrative actions against 
attorneys and accountants to censure, suspend, or bar them from appearing or practicing before 
the SEC).  
6
 See 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (implementing Sarbanes-Oxley § 307) and 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) 
(allowing SEC to censure and bar attorneys from appearing or practicing before the SEC).  See 
also, Roger Cramton, George Cohen & Susan Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 740 (2004). 
7
 George W. Dent, Jr., Lawyers In The Crosshairs: The New Legal And Ethical Duties Of 
Corporate Attorneys: Introduction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 337, 338 (2007) (Noting that “SEC 
enforcement actions [against attorneys] have mushroomed. There is also concern that . . . the 
SEC has altered its enforcement program, and now under [its censure/suspension authority] it 
pursues attorneys allegedly guilty of nothing worse than negligence. Private damage actions 
against lawyers also seem to have increased.”). 
8
 See generally, Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism, 
Duties and Advice, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2012).  Indeed, law review discussions regarding how 
far a tax practitioner can go in counseling tax reduction strategies to clients can be found as early 
  
system.9  Additionally, as a practical matter, most tax practitioners likely conducted their affairs 
in a manner consistent with such a role even if they did not specifically endorse gatekeeping as 
an actual ethical requirement.10  However, with the advent of widespread lawyer assisted tax 
shelters activity in the 1970s and the 1990s, this reality began to change.  Despite academic 
protestations to the contrary, an ethical gatekeeping norm has, as both a formal and practical 
matter, been increasingly questioned, and seemingly rejected, by a large segment of the tax bar in 
recent decades.11  This lack of self-regulation has opened the door for the federal government12 
                                                                                                                                                             
as the 1920s.  See, e.g., John H. Sears, Effective and Lawful Avoidance of Taxes, 8 VA. L. REV. 
77, 85 (1921). 
9
 William H. Simon, Organizational Representation and the Frontiers of Gatekeeping,19 AM. 
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1069, 1073 (2011) (“there is a longstanding tradition within the 
elite tax bar that embraces the gatekeeping role”); BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & 
KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 101.2 (1999 5th ed.) (“The practitioner’s 
obligation to the client, however, is not unrestricted.  The practitioner also owes a duty, albeit 
less well-defined, to the tax system as a whole.”); Franklin Green, Exercising Judgment in the 
Wonderland Gymnasium, 90 TAX NOTES 1691, 1692-93 (Mar. 19, 2001) (“[I]t has been a 
fundamental role of tax practitioners to identify for taxpayers those tax return positions that may 
be attempted and those that are beyond the pale.…  In a real sense, the tax adviser is a gatekeeper 
who regulates the flow of issues into the system….  For self-assessment to be workable, tax 
advisers cannot fail to perform their gatekeeper function and cannot allow a floodtide of 
illegitimate issues to swamp the system.  Accordingly, it is imperative that tax advisers apply 
professional standards with intellectual honesty in determining what positions have enough 
credibility to be able to be asserted.”); Deborah H. Schenk, Book Review: Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1995, 2005 (1982).  For a detailed compendium of the leading tax ethics commentators 
on this point from the 1945-1965 period, see Hatfield, supra note 8, at 15-28. 
10
 That is, it was in the professional best interest of the practitioner to be seen by the taxing 
authorities as having high standards so that he would be in the best position to represent his 
client’s interests and to foster a less adversarial relationship between taxpayers and the 
government to everyone’s mutual benefit.  Id. at 27-28.   
11
 See e.g., William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibility 
of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457-58 (2007) (noting dichotomy within 
tax bar between tax shelter “formalists” and anti-tax shelter practitioners who assert a duty to the 
tax system); Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the 
Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43 (2001) (discussing 
attorney complicity in tax shelter activity and advocating for a return to a tax lawyer gatekeeping 
function); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter 
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2006) (same); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to 
Clients and Duties to Others--the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the 
  
to insert itself into the attorney-client relationship by both implicitly and explicitly regulating and 
proscribing attorney behavior.13  In the wake of these changes, but coinciding with the severe 
economic downturn since 2008, promoted tax shelter activity of the type prevalent in the 1990s 
and early 2000s appears to have subsided.14   
However, tax shelter activity can take many forms.  The factors that led to the 
decline of the tax bar’s gatekeeping role in the 1970s and 1990s are still largely with us today 
                                                                                                                                                             
Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169 (2009) (advocating for the rejection of any 
tax practitioner duty to the system). 
12
 In the tax context federal government action can take many forms, from Congressional 
legislation to administrative actions.  On the administrative axis the Treasury Department has 
primary responsibility for interpreting and administering the tax laws.  Primary responsibility for 
developing tax policy and reviewing tax regulations resides in the Treasury’s Office of Tax 
Policy.  However, the largest bureau within the Treasury Department is the Internal Revenue 
Service which has been delegated the responsibility for determining, assessing and collecting the 
revenue owed by taxpayers.  Other Executive Branch agencies also have ancillary tax functions 
as well.  For instance, the Tax Division of the Department of Justice handles most tax litigation 
functions for the government.  This article will use the term “Government” to generally refer to 
the entire panoply of legislative and executive aspects of the federal government that can play a 
role in regard to regulating attorneys generally, and in particular tax practitioners.  The Internal 
Revenue Service itself will sometimes be referred to as either the “IRS” or the “Service.”   
13
 See Part III, infra.  See also, Rachelle Y Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185 (2010) (advocating for the Government to do even more to formalize 
the gatekeeping functions of tax attorneys); Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance: “This Return 
Might Be Correct But Probably Isn’t”, 29 VA. TAX REV. 645 (2010) (advocating that a “more 
likely than not” tax return position standard be applicable for all taxpayers and advisors).  For 
more generalized discussions of the evolving role of the Government in prescribing the ethical 
responsibilities of lawyers in various areas, see Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994); Daniel R. Coquillette and Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s 
Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics through Legislative, Court, and Agency 
Regulations, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2011); Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 
Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of the American Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 489 (2011). 
14
 Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters in the United States, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 585, 604 (2010) (noting that while corporate tax shelter activity has decreased it is 
likely to return when the economy improves if the Government is not vigilant); Susan Cleary 
Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (2006) (arguing that compliance norms at large corporations were 
strengthened by the Government’s responses to the most recent wave of corporate tax shelter 
activity). 
  
despite recent Government actions.  It remains to be seen whether the next economic upswing 
will reignite the tax shelter industry as well, despite the recently erected roadblocks.15  If so, 
what role will tax practitioners play?  Will they resume a strong gatekeeping role and act to 
quash these new tax shelter schemes in their infancy?  Or, will they adhere to Lord Brougham’s 
mantra and again plunge the tax system into disarray and confusion?  If the latter, then the tax 
bar can expect the Government to place ever more draconian restrictions on them to dissuade 
their complicity in undermining the fairness and integrity of the tax system.   
A central thesis of this article is that, it is in the self-interest of all the parties 
involved to take decisive action now to return to and strengthen the tax bar’s historical 
gatekeeping function.  The Government benefits by obtaining more accurate taxpayer reporting 
of transactions and avoiding the substantial distraction of dealing with yet another tax shelter 
crisis.  Society benefits by having a stronger and fairer system of taxation that in turn bolsters the 
taxpaying commitment of all taxpayers.16  Attorneys benefit by preserving their ability to self-
regulate as a profession, maintaining their status as professionals, and preserving more latitude in 
assisting their clients in non-abusive tax situations.17  Clients benefit from being able to receive 
freer tax advice in structuring ordinary course business motivated transactions (which advice 
might be curtailed inadvertently as a consequence of stricter governmental involvement in 
                                                 
15
 Kaye, supra note 14, at 604; sources cited at infra note 106. 
16
 See generally, Richard Lavoie, Flying Above the Law and Below the Radar: Instilling a 
Taxpaying Ethos in Those Playing by Their Own Rules, 29 PACE L. REV. 637 (2009). 
17
 Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility, 19 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 167 (2006) (“if lawyers are unwilling to recommit themselves to the 
regulation of their profession and their responsibilities to society, one might expect additional 
regulations [regarding attorney behavior].”); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well By Doing Good? The 
Role Of Public Service In The Careers Of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 83 
(2004) (“such sacred cows as self-regulation and the attorney-client privilege are likely to come 
under great pressure if lawyers lose their reputation as a ‘public profession’ dedicated to the 
public interest.”). 
  
attorney regulation) and by avoiding the time, expense and angst of ultimately trying to defend 
abusive transactions before the Government and in the court of public opinion.18  
While at one point the gatekeeping concept was thought to be sui generis to the 
realm of taxation, that position is no longer viable today.  Over the years the legal environment 
has evolved from a broad constitutional and common law base into one increasingly focused on 
complex statutory schemes that are implemented and administered by regulatory agencies.  Thus, 
the primary factor that prompted calls for tax gatekeeping (i.e., the practical inability of the 
Government to comprehensively check and monitor adherence to the law, which thus 
necessitates a system of voluntary self-compliance by citizens) has emerged as a central reality in 
most regulatory contexts.  The calls we see today for increased attorney gatekeeping functions in 
other areas of the law derive largely from the Government’s recognition that it cannot effectively 
curtail unjustified citizen behavior without the help of the practicing lawyers working in that area 
to promote compliance by their clients.  Just as in the field of taxation, if those attorneys fail 
embrace a gatekeeping function on their own initiative, the Government can be expected to 
impose one on them which may well not be to their, or their clients’, liking.  The primary lesson 
to be learned from the tax experience with gatekeeping, is the importance of preserving as much 
of the attorney-client relationship as possible by embracing self-regulation as a means of pre-
empting more draconian changes that would otherwise be likely to occur. 
                                                 
18
 See Michele Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment One: 
Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259 (2009), Michele 
Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment Two: How Far 
Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119 (2010) (advocating in favor of 
corporate attorneys providing advice regarding public opinion aspects of corporate transactions 
in light of results from empirical survey study).  See also, Kathleen F. Brickey, From Boardroom 
to Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media and the Corporate Governance Scandals, 33 J. CORP. L. 
625, 636 (2008); David M. Sudbury, The Role of Corporate Counsel in the Criminal 
Environmental Case: Advice to Quench the Fire, 3 VILL. ENVT’L. L.J. 95. 110 (1992). 
  
Part II of the article discusses the history, theory and practice of gatekeeping 
within the tax bar.  Part III highlights the decline in such gatekeeping activity as evidenced by 
the rampant tax shelter activity in recent times, and identifies some of the key factors that led to 
the weakening, and apparent abandonment, of the tax bar’s traditional gatekeeping role.  Part IV 
examines the potential risks to all parties involved if the tax bar’s gatekeeping role is not 
resurrected and discusses how a consensus in favor of an ethical gatekeeping norm can be forged 
despite the competitive and other pressures pushing the bar in the opposite direction.  Part V 
notes that while the current legal landscape presents difficult terrain on which to foster a strong 
gatekeeping norm, a concerted effort by all concerned can successfully entrench this norm to the 
ultimate benefit of all involved.  That Part then concludes by finding that the tax gatekeeping 
example is highly relevant to other areas of the law where commentators and the Government are 
suggesting an attorney gatekeeping function is appropriate. 
II. Tax Lawyers as Gatekeepers 
A. What Does Tax “Gatekeeping” Entail? 
Lord Brougham’s standard of zealous advocacy stakes out a clear threshold for 
the extent to which an attorney can ethically consider the consequences of his actions to those 
other than his client.  In short, he can’t.19  However, once it is granted that an attorney may, or 
must, ethically consider consequences beyond those to his client, it introduces shades of gray 
into the interpretation of a lawyer’s actions.  What are the parameters which define the scope of 
the lawyer’s gatekeeping role?  Should the duty be found only in a general duty to work for the 
betterment of the law on his own time as a lawyer-citizen, or does the duty extend to specific 
                                                 
19
 Of course, under even an extreme view of the zealous advocacy role, an attorney’s actions are 
not completely unfettered.  For instance, no one would claim that an attorney should be ethically 
  
client representations?  If so, does it reach only client actions that are clearly accepted as illegal 
under current law, or can it intrude into areas where reasonable minds might differ regarding the 
legal outcome?  At the extreme, must an attorney limit his involvement to situations where the 
client’s position is the clearly accepted one under current law?   
Even once the relevant scope is identified, what action must or may an attorney 
take when weighing his client’s interests against adverse consequences to others?  Is it sufficient 
to merely bring the tension to the client’s attention?  Or must he counsel against the client’s 
action?  If the latter, must the practitioner actually withdraw from the representation if his 
counsel is ignored?  Or does the obligation (especially if the harmed party would be the 
Government) run even deeper, compelling him to affirmatively bring the recalcitrant client’s 
actions to the attention of the injured party despite his general duty of client confidentiality?  
Finally, to what extent should the gatekeeping function differ based on the legal context, both in 
terms of the field of law involved and in terms of the type of advocacy being undertaken? 
In the tax field the answer to these questions has typically been driven by 
concerns about dissuading overly aggressive tax planning.20  So, there is little dispute regarding a 
tax attorney’s obligation to deal truthfully with the Government when responding to inquiries 
                                                                                                                                                             
permitted to fabricate or destroy evidence, make false statements to a tribunal, or act to further an 
ongoing crime.  See e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3. 
20
 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and 
Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 874 (2002) (“The difference between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion is that the latter is illegal, while the former is just smart tax planning. 
The boundary between the two is blurry.”); Holmes, supra note 13, at 187 (2010) (“the line 
between legitimate tax planning . . . and overly aggressive or abusive reporting by taxpayers 
continues to get pushed.”); Lavoie, supra note 11, at 49 (“The inherent tension between 
legitimate tax planning and the creation of abusive tax shelters presents [a] line drawing exercise: 
which transactions should the tax law dissuade and prohibit as abusive, and which transactions 
should the tax law permit as attempts to work within the statutory framework toward the goal of 
legitimate tax minimization?”). 
  
about underlying facts21 and to advise his client against taking frivolous or patently improper tax 
positions.22  Conversely, when a tax matter proceeds to actual litigation, the accepted view has 
been that a tax lawyer’s obligations are the same as in any other type of litigation.23  The 
questions become harder when a tax lawyer is consulted in the planning stages of a transaction, 
where the legal questions presented rarely have clear cut answers.  The role of the tax lawyer is 
to sort through the extant authorities and utilize her experience and judgment in determining the 
legal strength of a given tax position.24  The analysis is multifaceted, involving not just an 
                                                 
21
 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. section 10.20 (“A practitioner must, on a proper and lawful request by a 
duly authorized officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service, promptly submit records or 
information in any matter before the Internal Revenue Service unless the practitioner believes in 
good faith and on reasonable grounds that the records or information are privileged.”); 31 C.F.R. 
section 10.51 (explicitly noting that a practitioner may be censured, suspended, or disbarred from 
practice before the IRS for “[g]iving false or misleading information, or participating in any way 
in the giving of false or misleading information to the Department of the Treasury or any officer 
or employee thereof, or to any tribunal authorized to pass upon Federal tax matters, in 
connection with any matter pending or likely to be pending before them, knowing the 
information to be false or misleading.”).  Of course ABA Model Rule 4.1 is also explicit that an 
attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of any material fact to any party in 
representing a client. See also, ABA Formal Opinion 93-375 (Aug. 6, 1993) (an attorney 
representing a client in the context of a governmental agency investigation “may not under any 
circumstances lie to or mislead agency officials, either by affirmative misstatement or by 
omitting a material fact necessary to assure that statements made are not false or misleading.”). 
22
 As discussed infra at Part III.A.1., even with its most liberal interpretation, the bar has 
maintained that a tax return reporting position must have at least a “reasonable basis” for a 
practitioner to advise in its favor.  ABA Formal Opinion 314.  While the “reasonable basis” 
standard used in that opinion was interpreted by some as requiring only a “colorable basis” for a 
position, the position still could not be completely frivolous.  ABA Opinion 85-352 (explaining 
the need for clarifying the standard announced in Opinion 314).  Again, this also accords with 
the acknowledged limits to the zealous advocacy norm generally.  See Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”). 
23
 See Hatfield, supra note 8, at 52.  Although, as noted earlier, in recent times commentators 
have begun to question the extent to which a strong zealous advocacy standard is appropriate 
even in pure litigation settings.  See supra note 3. 
24
 Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing 
the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 20 (2008); Frank J. Gould, Giving Tax Advice - 
Some Ethical, Professional, and Legal Considerations, 97 TAX NOTES 523 (2002); Jasper L. 
Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the “Should” Opinion, 98 
  
intimate understanding of the particular statutory and regulatory provisions involved, but a keen 
appreciation for the policy considerations underlying the rules, the non-tax related business 
motivations of the client, and the anticipated reaction of the judiciary if litigation ultimately 
ensues.  However, despite this grounding, the lawyer’s view of the advisability of a transaction 
may often appear to a layman as simply a “smell test” akin to an “I know it when I see it” 
obscenity-like standard.25  The key however, is that the grounding of the analysis should create a 
commonality of approach that leads most practitioners to reach similar conclusions regarding the 
appropriateness of any given transaction.26  So, as discussed in this article, the scope of tax 
gatekeeping is primarily centered on this grey area of aggressive tax-motivated planning.   
Within that scope, determining how strong a position needs to be before it can be 
ethically advised has been a matter of debate over the years.  Depending on the time period and 
the context, the answer has changed dramatically.27  As discussed more fully in Part III below, 
the Government’s return preparer penalty provisions now provide that, in essence,28 a tax advisor 
needs a reasonable belief that an advised position more likely than not would be sustained if 
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 See Part III.A., infra for a discussion of how return position standards have evolved over time. 
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 The statutory standard discussed here, section 6694, literally only applies to a person who 
prepares at least a substantial portion of a tax return or claim for refund for compensation.  26 
U.S.C. § 7701(a)(36)(A).  However, the Treasury Department’s rules governing practice before 
the Internal Revenue Service (“Circular 230,” codified at 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, Part 10) are 
significantly broader and provide that “a practitioner may not willfully, recklessly, or through 
gross incompetence” advise a client to take a position on a tax return or claim for refund unless 
the section 6694 certainty standards are met.  31 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1)(ii).  Additionally, the 
relevant penalty provisions applicable directly to taxpayers reflect substantially the same 
certainty standards as well, and thus the advice that a practitioner will provide to a taxpayer 
  
there is either (1) a significant purpose of a plan or arrangement to avoid or evade federal 
income tax or (2) the transaction meets certain criteria causing it to qualify as a specifically 
reportable transaction.29  If the underlying transaction does not have a significant tax avoidance 
purpose, then an undisclosed position still must be supported by “substantial authority”30, and a 
position that will be adequately disclosed by the taxpayer on his tax return must have a 
“reasonable basis.”31  A tax return preparer that violates these guidelines is subject to penalty.32  
Tax attorneys who do not meet the requirements of a return preparer may still find themselves in 
violation of the Government’s rules for practice before the Internal Revenue Service.33  In any 
event, an attorney violating these guidelines might be open to malpractice claims from his 
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patently improper.”  The regulations explain that it is not satisfied by a position that is “merely 
colorable” or “merely arguable.”  However, if the position is based on one of the authorities set 
out in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662–4(d)(3)(iii) “(taking into account the relevance and persuasiveness of 
the authorities, and subsequent developments), the return position will generally satisfy the 
reasonable basis standard even though it may not satisfy the substantial authority standard.” Most 
commentators peg the reasonable basis standard as indicating an approximately twenty percent 
(20%) or greater chance of success on the merits.  See authorities cited in supra note 30. 
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 Section 6694 provides a penalty for tax return or refund claim equal to the greater of $1,000 or 
50 percent of the income derived by the return preparer from the subject return or claim.  26 
U.S.C. § 6694(a)(1). 
  
client.34  As a result, if an attorney firmly believes a client’s intended tax reporting of a 
transaction would violate these standards, it is unlikely that the attorney would continue to 
represent the client.   
Nevertheless, in many such cases the decision regarding whether the relevant 
reporting standards would be violated will be a close one.  In those situations, an attorney who 
views his role as a zealous advocate (or more cynically, whose economic interests are tied to 
allowing the client to proceed) might be more inclined to color her assessment of the transaction 
in the client’s favor.  This is where a strong gatekeeping ethical norm would encourage 
practitioners to hew to a more conservative view of the issue and thereby dissuade more 
questionable transactions at the margin.  But, should tax attorneys undertake such a gatekeeping 
function when doing so is arguably detrimental to their clients’ interests? 
B. Justifications for Tax Gatekeeping 
A number of arguments have been made to support a gatekeeping role for the tax 
attorneys.  Some have argued that since taxes are used for the benefit of the society as a whole 
and taxpayers have an interest in seeing that taxes are paid, the relationship between taxpayer 
and government is not a truly adversarial one and therefore the zealous advocacy norms that 
would apply to a normal civil adversary should not apply.35  Others have noted that tax 
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 31 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1)(ii).  See discussion at supra note 28. 
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AM. U.L. REV. 267, 269 (2008). 
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 Hatfield, supra note 8, at 16.  Of course, it can be easily responded that while this is true in the 
abstract, once any particular tax dispute arises, the specific taxpayer involved will either pay 
more or less depending on the outcome and therefore, at least in a controversy setting the 
relationship between the taxpayer and the government is fully as adversarial as in any other 
litigation.   
  
practitioners are subject to direct regulation by the Government,36 and as such can be said to owe 
duties to the Government due to this special relationship.37  A crasser justification is that 
gatekeeping helps lawyers maintain their personal reputation vis a vis the Government and 
therefore it is in their personal interest, as well as indirectly in the general interest of all their 
current and future clients.38  However, the primary justification for a gatekeeping role in tax 
practice arises from the very nature of our tax system. 
The hallmark of the U.S. income tax system is its self-assessment nature.39  That 
is, taxpayers determine how the tax law applies to their particular situation and then calculate and 
pay their tax liability accordingly.40  This puts the initial burden on taxpayers to apply the law 
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 The Secretary of the Treasury has authority to regulate the conduct of, and to discipline, 
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 Doran, supra note 30, at 113; Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary’s 
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correctly to their personal situation.  Indeed, in filing their tax returns taxpayers must affirm 
under penalties of perjury their belief that the return is “true, correct and complete.”41  Of course, 
our tax laws are complex and understanding them in concept, let alone how they apply and 
interrelate in a given fact pattern, is often unclear.  Consequently, taxpayers look to, and the 
efficient functioning of the tax system relies on, the advice of tax practitioners to guide them as 
to the most appropriate interpretation of the law.  Note that the taxpayer’s has the legal duty to 
report his correct tax based on his facts and the relevant law.42  Consequently, this goal, reporting 
the correct tax, also should be the guiding principle for the tax adviser.43   
However, the gatekeeping responsibility of the tax lawyer is not just premised on 
helping the client meet the legal obligation of arriving at the correct tax, but is also premised on 
the Government’s inability to adequately double check each taxpayer’s initial tax determination.  
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 See, e.g., IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Form 1040 (2011), available at 
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arriving at his decision regarding what his “correct” tax liability is.  See, e.g., Calvin Johnson 
‘True And Correct:’ Standards For Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAX NOTES 1521 (1989); Beale, 
supra note 30, at 594.   
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 Myron C. Grauer, What’s Wrong with This Picture?: The Tension Between Analytical 
Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1991) 
(practitioner’s duties derive from taxpayer’s duty to file true and correct tax return); Gwen 
Thayer Handelman, Reply, Counseling Ordered Liberty, 9 VA. TAX REV. 781, 781-86 (1990) 
(practitioner’s reporting position obligations derivative of the client’s duties to comply with the 
tax laws). 
  
Each year the Government can audit only a small fraction of all taxpayer returns.44  If taxpayers 
routinely report their taxes based on the most aggressive interpretation of the law, instead of 
based on an even-handed one, then the fisc will be harmed.  Further, as the magnitude of such 
aggressive reporting increases, it breeds disrespect for the law and encourages others to push the 
envelope as well.45  This would be a weight our tax system could not bear.   
Further, when tax practitioners are involved in planning transactions, or assisting 
taxpayers in developing their reporting positions for a completed transaction, one can question 
whether such work is truly adversarial, as that term has been traditionally interpreted.  Our 
adversarial system of justice contemplates a competition among equals that is intended to 
efficiently and fairly yield the “truth.”46  Thus, having a taxpayer make colorable arguments 
regarding his proper tax burden is justifiable once the issue has been joined with the Government 
(either administratively or in litigation), but making those identical claims on an initial tax return, 
when no adversary has yet entered the ring, impedes the arrival at a fair result.   
As one commentator put it, the “fundamental role of tax practitioners [is] to 
identify for taxpayers those tax return positions that may be attempted and those that are beyond 
the pale. . . .  In a real sense, the tax adviser is a gatekeeper who regulates the flow of issues into 
the system. . . .  For self-assessment to be workable, tax advisers cannot fail to perform their 
gatekeeper function and cannot allow a floodtide of illegitimate issues to swamp the system.  
Accordingly, it is imperative that tax advisers apply professional standards with intellectual 
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honesty in determining what positions have enough credibility to be able to be asserted.”47  Of 
course, determining exactly how weak a position must be to trigger this gatekeeper intervention 
is a highly relevant question that has been the subject of much debate, but defining the relevant 
threshold is intellectually distinct from the question of whether there is a gatekeeping obligation 
at all.  
C. Arguments Against Tax Gatekeeping 
While the existence of a tax gatekeeping obligation has traditionally been 
acknowledged by many in the tax bar,48 there has always been a segment of the bar that rejected 
this proposition,49 including some very well-known tax lawyers.50  While there are variations of 
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degree, the primary argument against a gatekeeping role for tax attorneys grounded itself in the 
zealous advocacy norm.  At the extreme, some expressed libertarian fears of the government 
acting as “Big Brother” through attorneys being required to report on their own clients.51  For 
others the rejection of any gatekeeping role arose from blind allegiance to the concept that the 
role of a lawyer is purely to serve his client’s interests without any moral judgment.52   
Others viewed any weakening of a strong zealous advocacy norm as holding out 
the prospect of creating intolerable conflicts of interest between attorneys and their clients due to 
the attorney’s competing obligation to the Government.53  A more nuanced version of this claim 
was that a client’s knowledge of his attorney’s dual obligations would make the client less 
forthcoming with underlying facts and motivations, with the result that the lawyer’s legal advice 
would be skewed, or cause clients to not seek legal advice at all.54  Viewed in this light, 
weakening the zealous advocacy norm, even in a planning context, in fact undermines the 
bedrock taxpayer compliance required for the self-assessment system to function.55  Intriguingly 
this argument contains an internal contradiction.  The argument maintains that a gatekeeping role 
will dissuade taxpayers from seeking legal advice (or hiding the true facts when seeking advice) 
and as a result taxpayers will take unjustified positions.  The implication is that, in the absence of 
a gatekeeping obligation, taxpayers would get full unfettered pro-taxpayer advice and yet the 
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taxpayers would take fewer unjustified positions.  Why would that be the case unless the 
presence of the attorney in fact did dissuade unwarranted taxpayer positions, implicitly 
recognizing that the attorneys must be performing at least some gatekeeping despite their 
purported zealous advocacy?   
The interesting commonality between the traditional arguments for and against a 
gatekeeper role is that both sets of arguments largely devolve into a debate about the scope of the 
zealous advocacy norm and its appropriateness outside of a litigation or controversy context.  
Those resisting a special gatekeeping obligation for tax practitioners often grounded their 
opposition in part on the premise that the ethical obligations of attorneys should be the same 
regardless of their field.56  As discussed earlier, this article, and the recent evolution in legal 
ethics generally, favor the contrary position; that it is appropriate to modify the zealous advocacy 
norm in non-adversarial contexts.  So, the traditional arguments against a specific tax 
gatekeeping duty are weaker today than was true historically since the perception of the lawyer’s 
role in non-adversarial contexts generally has undergone a transformation.   
D. The Practical Approach 
Beyond those actively arguing whether tax lawyers had a gatekeeping duty, a 
third segment of the tax bar historically took the position that the entire question was merely a 
matter of academic interest.57  That is, the general obligation of taxpayers to file a correct return 
and other specific Government rules regarding factual disclosures by taxpayers and their 
representatives were sufficient to ensure taxpayer compliance with the self-assessment system 
without any need to imply any additional specific duty on tax practitioners.  Further, it was 
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argued that as a matter of practical lawyering, most tax advisors would counsel their clients to 
act prudently in any event whether or not any specific gatekeeping obligation actually existed.  
As one commentator stated: 
[Y]ou are never really up against the gun to determine whether the practitioner 
does have dual responsibilities [to his client and to his government], but that it is 
just good business for you, for the client and for the government to try to 
minimize adversary aspects just as much as possible, and to increase the 
disclosure aspects just as much as possible, and thereby to improve relationships 
among the three of you as much as possible. . . .  [It is a] mere academic exercise 
when we discuss the degree to which there is this dual relationship . . .  [but] it is 
in our best interest to act as if there were a dual responsibility. 58 
 
Thus, as a practical matter, through the mid-1960s, many tax attorneys implicitly exercised a 
gatekeeping function, irrespective of whether they acknowledged an actual ethical obligation to 
do so.   
III. The Decline of Tax Gatekeeping 
A. The Rise of Lawyer Facilitated Tax Shelter Activity 
The prevailing gatekeeping norm in the tax bar began to noticeably weaken with 
the wave of tax shelters focused on individual taxpayers that swept the country in the 1970s and 
then dissipated further with the wave of corporate tax shelters that occurred in the 1990s.  Both 
periods were characterized by the use of legal opinions to bless highly aggressive tax avoidance 
transactions.  In both situations, the tax bar was unable, or unwilling, to stem the tax shelter tide 
and that failure resulted in increased regulation of tax opinion practice by the Government as 
well as changes to the statutory penalty provisions applicable to taxpayers.  These tax shelter 
waves provide stark evidence of the abdication of their traditional gatekeeping function by a 
significant portion of the tax bar. 
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1. The Tax Shelters of the 1970s 
Up through 1965 then, the prevailing (although by no means monolithic) position 
of the tax bar, as evidenced by the commentary of the time and actual prudent practice, was to 
endorse a gatekeeping function.59  In 1965 the American Bar Association Ethics Committee, in 
Formal Opinion 314 (the “1965 Opinion”), seriously challenged this prevailing ethical norm.60  
The 1965 Opinion took the position that since disputes with the Government regarding a 
taxpayer’s tax liability were adversarial, and the taxpayer’s filing of a tax return was the first step 
in any ultimate dispute, a lawyer ethically should resolve doubts in favor of the client in pre-
return tax planning.61  Further, the 1965 Opinion refused to treat the Government as a “tribunal” 
to which a higher duty of disclosure would be required.  The bottom line assessment in the 1965 
Opinion was that a lawyer could ethically advise a client to take any position without any 
highlighting disclosure as long as there was a “reasonable basis” for the position.62  In reaching 
its conclusion, the 1965 Opinion completely ignored the reality of the self-assessment system 
and the taxpayer’s legal obligation to report their correct tax liability.  Given the low 
Government audit rate, a lawyer’s advice to take an extreme tax return position without specific 
disclosure to the Government would most often result in a de facto final determination that the 
position was correct, rather than merely indicating that the position would not be considered 
fraudulent or frivolous by a court in an ultimate litigation.63  However, despite its logical flaws, 
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the 1965 Opinion was in line with the popular conception of the tax law,64 including by the 
courts,65 to think of tax law interpretation as a completely objective economic calculus imbued 
with no moral, ethical or societal considerations.66  Similarly, the pro-taxpayer stance in the 1965 
Opinion coincided with a decrease in certain broader societal norms which had acted as a 
counterbalance to this amoral approach to taxpaying obligations.67   
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The reasonable basis standard set forth in the 1965 Opinion became the accepted 
standard used by tax practitioners in providing tax return advice for the next 20 years.68  During 
this period there was an explosion of tax shelter activity.69  These tax shelters typically involved 
creating investment vehicles where investors were promised large tax benefits in connection with 
their investments.70  Typically, the claimed tax benefits for the investments were justified based 
on tax opinions provided by tax lawyers involved in developing the underlying investment 
transaction.71  Unfortunately for all involved, these opinions typically did not forthrightly address 
the relevant law, were based on incorrect factual assumptions, or failed to actually state the 
likelihood of success if the transaction were questioned by the Government.72  While the number 
                                                                                                                                                             
war period prominent lawyers highlighted patriotic reasons for paying taxes in order to support 
the government was a vital component in the effort to defeat the communist threat to capitalism.  
Hatfield, supra note 8, at 11-13.  However, as the Cold War dragged on (eventually giving way 
to détente) and the public became consumed with the personal and financial toll of an unpopular 
war in Vietnam, the broader societal impetus supporting tax adherence for patriotic reasons was 
correspondingly weakened. 
68
 It was not until 1985 that the ABA modified the reasonable basis standard out of concern that 
some practitioners were interpreting it to be a lower level of certitude than intended.  ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reprinted in 39 
TAX LAW. 631, 631 (1986) (“The Committee is informed that the standard of “reasonable basis” 
has been construed by many lawyers to support the use of any colorable claim on a tax return to 
justify exploitation of the lottery of the tax return audit selection process. This view is not 
universally held, and the Committee does not believe that the reasonable basis standard, properly 
interpreted and applied, permits this construction.”). 
69
 George Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54 
SMU L. REV. 209, 211-16 (2001) (generally describing the scope of the tax shelter problem in 
the 1970s and 1980s). 
70
 Often these were real estate investment partnerships exploiting the use of non-recourse debt 
financing made possible by the Supreme Court’s decision in Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 
(1947).  Christian C. Day, Commissioner v. Tufts: The Fall of Footnote 37; The Confirmation of 
The Functional Relationship, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 803 (1984).   
71
 James Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 314, 346 and 
Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 212-17 (1985) (describing the syndicated tax shelters of the 
period and the role of tax opinions in facilitating these transactions). 
72
 Id. See also, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAWYER’S ROLE IN TAX PRACTICE, THE 
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, The Lawyer’s Role in Tax Practice, 
  
of tax attorneys actually involved in drafting such opinions and promoting these tax shelters was 
relatively small, the broader tax bar failed to effectively dissuade their colleagues from engaging 
in this activity and failed to dissuade the public from engaging in these aggressive transactions.73   
As a result of the failure of the tax bar to effectively curtail the creation and use of 
these tax shelter opinions, the Government was forced to intervene more directly.  In the early 
1980s the Government proposed, and ultimately adopted in modified form, specific provisions in 
Circular 230 regulating the content of tax opinions used in these tax shelter transactions,74 
enacted various tax penalty provisions,75 enacted increased disclosure, reporting and procedural 
requirements,76 and passed numerous substantive changes to the tax law77 all aimed at addressing 
aspects of the tax shelter problem.  Similarly, the courts were active in the fight against such tax 
                                                                                                                                                             
reprinted in, 36 TAX LAW. 865 (1982) (generally describing the tax lawyer’s role in syndicating 
tax shelters). 
73
 While the investments made by individuals in these syndicated tax shelters often would not be 
of sufficient magnitude to warrant investors seeking an independent opinion on the tax 
consequences (see, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 
(revised) (1982), reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 471, 471 (1982)), one would have expected the 
organized bar to take a more public stand regarding this type of shelter activity.  While the bar 
ultimately did act to provide guidance in Formal Opinion 346, id., that opinion came only after 
many years of tolerating this type of tax shelter activity and only after the Government had 
proposed amendments to Circular 230 to directly regulate practitioner behavior which the bar felt 
were overly strict.  See Tax Shelters; Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 
58,594 (1980) (proposed Aug. 29, 1980); Holden, supra note 71, at 217-18. 
74
 While the Government’s initially proposed amendments to Circular 230 were viewed by many 
practitioners as too strict, the changes ultimately adopted ended up instead as essentially 
codifying the core ethical standards the bar had adopted in Formal Opinion 346.  Id. at 222-24.  
See Amendments to Circular 230, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (1984). 
75
 See e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6659 (valuation overstatement penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 6661 (the substantial 
understatement penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 6700 (penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters); 26 
U.S.C. §§ 6707, 6708 (penalty for failing to furnish information regarding tax shelters). 
76
 See e.g.,  26 U.S.C. § 6045(e) (real estate transaction reporting); 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (promoter 
registration of tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. § 6112 (maintenance of investor lists by organizers and 
sellers of tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221-6231 (partnership audit rules); 26 U.S.C. § 7408 
(injunctive action against promoters of abusive tax shelters). 
  
shelter activity.78   While this type of tax shelter activity dissipated in the years following these 
changes, their contribution to that result is unclear since it appears that an unrelated statutory 
change, the adoption of the passive activity loss rules in 1986,79 was the primary factor in the 
demise of this particular type of tax shelter activity.80   
2. The Tax Shelters of the 1990s 
Contemporaneously with the widespread tax shelter activity in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, there was a marked decline in practitioner adherence to the reasonable basis tax 
reporting standard that the ABA had put forth in the 1965 Opinion.81  As a result, the ABA 
decided to revisit the question of the proper tax reporting certitude standard and as a result 
adopted Formal Opinion 85-352 of the ABA’s Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility (the “1985 Opinion”).82  The 1985 Opinion restated the relevant ethical standard 
for an attorney to counsel a tax return position as one that had “some realistic possibility” of 
success if litigated.83  While this standard was somewhat higher than the former reasonable basis 
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 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1250 (depreciation recapture rules); 26 U.S.C. § 704(b) (partnership 
allocation rules); 26 U.S.C. § 163(d) (investment interest limitations); 26 U.S.C. § 465(at-risk 
loss limitation rules), 26 U.S.C. §§ 1092, 1256 (straddle rules). 
78
 See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Frank Lyon Co. v. 
U.S., 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Hilton v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff’d per curiam, 671 F.2d 
316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); 
Odend’hal v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1984); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 
F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985). 
79
 26 U.S.C. § 469. 
80
 See, Yin, supra note 69, at 218-20 and sources cited therein; Christine Rucinski Strong & 
Susan Pace Hamill, Allocations Attributable to Partner Nonrecourse Liabilities: Issues Revealed 
by LLCs and LLPs, 51 ALA. L. REV. 603, 607 (2000). 
81
 Holden, supra note 71, at 235. 
82
 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reprinted 
in 39 TAX LAW. 631, 631 (1986). 
83
 Id.  Since most tax advice and tax opinion work by practitioners would not fall within the 
specific strictures of the syndicated tax shelter rules then embodied in Formal Opinion 346 and 
Circular 230, the “realistic possibility” certitude level set forth in the 1985 Opinion became the 
primary ethical consideration for practitioners following its adoption.  David Weisbach and 
  
benchmark, its underlying premise was essentially the same as that of the 1965 Opinion.  Both 
opinions considered filing tax returns to be aspects of the adversarial process and gave no serious 
consideration to the very different context between an actually joined adversarial proceeding and 
the mere filing of a tax return, especially in light of the necessarily low Government audit rate 
and the intended functioning of the self-assessment system.84  Thus, the relevant ethical 
guideline applicable to tax practitioners in planning situations was only marginally higher in the 
post-1985 period than it had been previously.85  
Similarly, while the 1980s heralded some changes in the civil penalties faced by 
taxpayers, the basic penalty structure remained one that left significant room for taxpayers and 
their legal advisors to undertake aggressive tax motivated transactions.  In rendering planning 
advice in the early 1990s, a tax lawyer primarily needed to consider only whether the proposed 
transaction would expose the client to either a negligence penalty86 or a substantial 
understatement penalty.87  As a general matter, a taxpayer could avoid both of these penalties if 
he obtained and relied in good faith on an opinion of counsel supporting the claimed position.88  
                                                                                                                                                             
Brian Gale, The Regulation of Tax Advice and Advisers, 130TAX NOTES 1279, 1285 (Mar. 14, 
2011).  Phrased in terms of percentages, a realistic possibility of success was considered to 
represent a 33% chance of success on the merits.  See authorities cited in supra note 30. 
84
 Durst, supra note 48, at 1047. 
85
 Dennis Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 470 (2008); Soled, 
supra note 34, at 291; Beale, supra note 30, at 628-29. 
86
 Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(1) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3.  The negligence penalty was 
inapplicable as long as a reasonable basis existed for the taxpayer’s position (or a realistic 
possibility of success existed if the position was directly contrary to certain published 
authorities).   
87
 Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(2) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4.  The substantial 
understatement penalty became applicable once an underpayment surpassed a threshold level, 
but, as discussed below, could be avoided if (provided a tax shelter transaction was not involved) 
the taxpayer had “substantial authority” for his reporting position or if the position was 
adequately disclosed. 
88
 This was true both due to the operation of the specific penalty provisions and due to an 
overarching “reasonable cause” exception under then section 6664.  That section provided that 
  
If the underlying transaction giving rise to the claimed tax benefit was one in which “the” 
principal purpose was the evasion or avoidance of tax, a “tax shelter” under the statute,89 then the 
opinion as a practical matter needed to find that the position was more likely than not correct.90  
However, since a tax shelter for purposes of the substantial understatement penalty only existed 
when the tax motive exceeded that of any other motive, transactions with business or profit 
making purposes would generally not be covered by this more likely than not standard.  In those 
cases, a taxpayer avoided any penalty for taking the position as long as “substantial authority” 
existed for the position.91  In non-tax shelter situations where substantial authority was ultimately 
found lacking, the taxpayer could often escape penalty due to reliance on a tax opinion finding 
that substantial authority existed.   
Thus at the start of the 1990s a tax practitioner could ethically counsel in favor of 
taking any position for which there was a realistic possibility of success, although in some cases 
the adviser would also have to alert the client to the need for disclosure of the position to 
eliminate the risk of penalties.  Further, by supplying the client with a tax opinion at a substantial 
authority level, or in tax shelter situations at a more likely than not level, the tax practitioner 
                                                                                                                                                             
no penalty would be applied to a taxpayer that was found, based on all the facts and 
circumstances, to have made a good faith effort to determine his proper tax liability (which could 
be shown by reasonable reliance on an opinion of counsel). 
89
 Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C); former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(2). 
90
 Technically, to avoid the penalty if a tax shelter was involved, the taxpayer need to show (1) 
that “substantial authority” existed for the position and (2) that the taxpayer had a reasonable 
belief that the position taken was “more likely than not” correct.  Id.  A taxpayer’s reasonable 
belief could be premised on a tax opinion stating a more likely than not conclusion. Id.   
91
 If no tax shelter were involved, then the substantial underpayment penalty would be 
inapplicable as long as either (1) substantial authority existed for the position or (2) the position 
was non-frivolous and it was adequately disclosed on the tax return.  Former 26 U.S.C. § 
6662(b)(2) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4.  While a tax opinion concluding that substantial 
authority existed obviously would not be conclusive regarding whether substantial authority 
actually did exist, the taxpayer’s reasonable reliance on such an opinion would generally allow 
  
could effectively insulate the client from potential civil penalties for taking the position.  This 
was the ethical and statutory backdrop for the wave of tax shelter activity that occurred in the 
1990s and early 2000s.   
Unlike the prior era of tax shelters, which focused on syndicating tax loss 
transactions to individual taxpayers based largely on abusing the non-recourse debt rules, the 
new wave of tax shelters were developed to exploit a wide variety of vagaries in the tax law and 
then confidentially marketed to corporations and wealthy individuals as tax savings templates 
that could be readily adapted to the particular client’s situation.92  The two periods were similar 
though in the fact that aggressive tax opinions and advisors played a central role in both creating 
and failing to impede these aggressive transactions.  Again, in the face of the bar’s unwillingness 
or inability to regulate its own behavior, the Government was forced to intercede with specific 
rules regulating the furnishing of tax planning advice and significant changes to the civil penalty 
provisions applicable to taxpayers.   
In terms of the regulation of tax advice, the Government significantly expanded 
the rules in Circular 230 regarding written tax advice well beyond the narrow rules applicable to 
the syndication tax opinions of concern in the 1970s and 1980s.  Today Circular 230 contains 
detailed guidelines governing a wide variety of written advice provided in tax planning 
situations.93  These rules were specifically intended to “send a strong message to tax 
                                                                                                                                                             
him to escape a penalty under the good faith exception of section 6664 even if the tax opinion 
turned out to be incorrect.  
92
 See generally, Lavoie, supra note , at 49-50; Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate 
Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1777 (June 21, 1999); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, TREASURY WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 2, 
1999, LEXIS 1999 TNT 127-12, 127-13. 
93
 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35, 10.36 and 10.37.  The main rules related to “covered opinions.”  A 
covered opinion is defined as any written advice regarding (1) any transaction that is the same or 
  
professionals considering selling a questionable product to clients” and to “rein in practitioners 
who disregard their ethical obligations.”94  Generally, the core requirements of these new rules 
for covered opinions are that tax advisors must be more vigilant in their factual inquiries, 
forthrightly deal with all the legal issues,95 and explicitly reach a conclusion that the proposed 
tax treatment of an issue is at least more likely than not correct or, if there is only a lesser 
confidence level, explicitly disclose that the taxpayer cannot rely on the opinion for penalty 
protection purposes on that issue.96  
In tandem with its direct regulation of practitioners’ written tax advice, the 
Government also made numerous changes in the relevant civil penalty provisions applicable to 
taxpayers.  In general, these changes were aimed at making it more difficult for taxpayers to 
avoid penalties.97  This was accomplished by increasing the certainty levels required to avoid the 
penalties, as well as by making it more difficult to use reliance on a tax opinion as a basis for 
                                                                                                                                                             
substantially similar to abusive transactions specifically identified by the Government in 
published guidance (“listed transactions”), (2) any plan or arrangement where “the” principal 
purpose is tax avoidance or evasion, and most importantly (3) any plan or arrangement where “a 
significant” purpose is tax avoidance or evasion if the opinion (a) expresses at least a more likely 
than not assessment on any issue in favor of the taxpayer (a “reliance opinion”), (b) is one the 
advisor knows, or has reason to know, will be used by the client or others to promote or market a 
transaction to taxpayers (a “marketed opinion”), or (c) is issued in conjunction with the adviser 
(i) agreeing to refund a portion of his fees if the taxpayer’s reporting position is not sustained or 
(ii) imposing a confidentiality requirement on the client.  Written advice not qualifying as a 
covered opinion is more lightly regulated under section 10.37.  
94
 IR-2004-152 (Dec. 17, 2004), 2004 IRB LEXIS 521, also avail at 
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=132445,00.html. (quoting then IRS Commissioner Mark W. 
Everson). 
95
 “Significant purpose” transactions can be limited to an examination of only certain issues, but 
market, listed and principal purpose opinion must deal with all relevant tax issues. 
96
 For a more detailed review and explanation of the current Circular 230 rules on written tax 
advice, see David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First 
Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 843, 850-67 (2006); Weisbach and Gale, supra note 83, at 1285-87. 
97
 Id. at 1288. 
  
exception from a penalty.98  For instance, while the baseline requirement today for avoiding a 
substantial understatement penalty on non-tax shelter positions remains a substantial authority 
confidence level, the definition of tax shelter has been significantly expanded to include any plan 
or arrangement with a significant tax avoidance or evasion purpose.99  If a substantial 
understatement of tax relates to such a tax shelter, then the penalty applies, despite the existence 
of substantial authority, unless the taxpayer can satisfy the general reasonable cause exception of 
section 6664.100  However, the relevant regulations under section 6664 have not been updated to 
provide guidance regarding how the reasonable cause standard is to be applied to 
understatements on individual tax returns following the various amendments to section 6662, so 
some uncertainty exists regarding the exact circumstances under which reasonable cause 
exception is still available.101   
Finally, as in the 1980s, the government and the courts also moved to strike at the 
underlying nature of the tax schemes.  In the 1980s this was accomplished through a wide variety 
of Governmental actions and court decisions.102  In the combating the more recent wave of tax 
shelters it took the form, among other things, of creating a new tax return schedule requiring 
certain corporations to specifically disclose uncertain tax positions,103 codifying the economic 
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 Id. at 1288-89. 
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 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C). 
100
 Additionally, if the transaction is found to lack economic substance (within the meaning of 26 
U.S.C. § 7701(o)) then the reasonable cause exception under section 6664 becomes inapplicable.  
Further, for certain reportable transactions incurring penalties under section 6662A, the 
requirements under section 6664 for showing reasonable cause are heightened.  26 U.S.C. § 
6664(d). 
101
 31 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4. 
102
 See supra notes 75-79. 
103
 Form 1120 Schedule UTP, available at, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120utp.pdf.  
  
substance doctrine (a judicial doctrine whose operation was previously subject to debate),104 and 
courts utilizing common law anti-abuse concepts to strike down aggressive transactions.105   
Following these Government and judicial actions the latest wave of tax shelter 
activity seems to have subsided.106  However, while insufficient gatekeeping by the tax bar 
clearly contributed to the growth of such shelters, it is impossible to quantify the impact of the 
Government’s increased direct regulation of tax practitioners in the subsiding of these tax 
shelters. 
B. Factors Contributing to Weakened Gatekeeping 
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that while a gatekeeping function was 
historically an ethical norm that the tax bar largely adhered to (at least in practice, even if not 
specifically acknowledged), that norm has been increasingly rejected by practitioners over recent 
decades.  It may be tempting to some to ascribe the tax shelter activity in modern times to the 
work of individual bad apples, or to bemoan the lack of individual moral character among 
modern day attorneys.107  But this explanation misses the fact that it is not the intrinsic nature of 
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 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o). 
105
 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); ASA Investerings P’ship v. 
Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998), aff’d, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Black & Decker, 
436 F.3d 431; Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d 1340; TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbors), 
459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 487 (2005); Long 
Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 171 n.68 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 
150 F. App’x 40, 2005-2 U.S.T.C. P 50,575 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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 Simon, supra note 9, at 1072; Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the Partnership Anti-
Abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. 401, 461 (2010); Calvin H. 
Johnson & Lawrence Zelenak, Codification of General Disallowance of Artificial Losses, 122 
TAX NOTES 1389, 1391 (2009) 
107
 Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 
19 (2011); Morse, supra note 14, at 988; Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, The 
Cash Economy, and Compliance Costs, 31 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).  However, the 
widespread nature of the tax shelter market in the 1990s and early 2000s belie the plausibility of 
  
the individuals involved that has changed.  Individuals will always act in their own self interest 
unless constrained by legal or societal constraints.108  Yet despite the immutability of 
humankind, ethical norms do not remain static.  What is currently ethically acceptable is 
primarily a function of the prevailing moral framework accepted by a society, as adapted to the 
context of the particular subgroup to which the ethical norm is applicable.109  So, the question is 
not why individual practitioners today are “less” ethical than their predecessors, but rather, why 
does the tax bar no longer view a gatekeeping function as the appropriate ethical norm?   
While numerous factors and changes over the recent decades have undoubtedly 
contributed to the shift in the ethical reality of tax practice, four overarching areas of change can 
be easily identified as highly significant in altering the ethical perceptions of the tax bar:  (1) 
evolving client norms for ethical behavior, (2) increasing competitive pressures on legal service 
providers, (3) changing judicial approaches to statutory interpretation, and (4) a lessening 
imperative favoring taxpaying in society as a whole.   
1. Client Norms for Ethical Behavior 
One of the key factors supporting the existence of a gatekeeping norm was the 
belief that by steering a client away from overly aggressive transactions the tax lawyer was in 
fact acting in the client’s best interest.  Implicit in this position was the assumption that the client 
agreed that (1) a taxpayer has a duty to forthrightly pay its allocable portion of the nation’s tax 
liability and that (2) the economic and public relations costs associated with defending 
questionable tax transactions outweighed the benefits from engaging in such transactions.  While 
                                                                                                                                                             
merely ascribing the activity to “bad apple” taxpayers and tax practitioners.  Lavoie, supra note 
40, at 186.    
108
 See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge 
University Press 1991) (1651). 
  
this was the accepted perception in the 1950s, matters have changed drastically since then.110  
While in the past business ethics were substantially co-extensive with the prevailing morality of 
society, today there exists a schism where a business person will think nothing of undertaking an 
action on behalf of his business that would not be condoned as a matter of personal behavior.111  
This creation of a separate business ethical culture has been driven by the idea that the focus of a 
corporation is properly only the creation of profits for the owners of the business.112  As a result, 
while businesses may highlight their socially responsible actions as a public relations and 
marketing matter, shareholder profits remain king.113  In such an environment, moral and ethical 
considerations are perceived as at most window dressing and therefore they have no power to 
curb behavior harmful to society. As a result, the key constraints on any economically justified 
business behavior are almost exclusively those actually imposed by law. 114  But how are even 
these legal constraints to be applied?  From a purely competitive vantage point, the goal of 
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 Lavoie, supra note 40, at 126. 
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 See supra note 67. 
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 Lavoie, supra note 40, at 168-69. 
112
 See David Campbell et al., Social Welfare, Positivism, and Business Ethics, 11 BUS. ETHICS: 
A EUROPEAN REV. 263 (2002) (discussing the ongoing conflict between business ethics and the 
drive for profits). See also Gordon Pearson, Making Profits and Sweet Music, 9 BUS. ETHICS: A 
EUROPEAN REV. 191 (2000). 
113
 John Philip Jones, Oversight without Inhibiting Enterprise, 603 ANNALS 262, 264 (2006) 
(“[CSR] has little real influence on the operating policy of major companies. From a large 
sample of such companies, it was found for instance that their donations to charity account for 
less than 1 percent of their pretax profits. To such companies, CSR may have benefits from the 
public relations standpoint, but that is about all.”).  Proponents of corporate social responsibility 
(“CSR”) often take the position that companies should place doing good for society above the 
bottom line.  See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the 
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 581 (2009).  However, many argue that in 
practice CSR efforts are merely co-opted by businesses for public relations and marketing 
purposes.  Michael B. Runnels, Elizabeth J. Kennedy, and Timothy B. Brown, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the New Governance: In Search Of Epstein’s Good Company In The 
Employment Context, 43 AKRON L. REV. 501, 532 (2010); Edwin M. Epstein, The Good 
Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 
AM. BUS. L.J. 27, 212 (2007).   
  
business is to minimize the impact of any legal constraints that do exist.  Hence, the direction 
from clients to their lawyers is clear, interpret the law as narrowly as possible and without 
reference to moral or ethical considerations.  The focus on the bottom line within the business 
world contributes to the perception that legal advisors serve merely as hired guns to further the 
goals of the client.115  The function of lawyers, while more than mere scriveners, became merely 
implementing exogenously determined business goals, rather than being active participants in 
helping to shape, channel, modify, or heaven forbid, question those announced goals.  In the face 
of such clear client driven directives to achieve legal conclusions consonant with the business 
bottom line, it became very difficult, if not impossible, for an attorney to justify a gatekeeping 
role as being in line with their client’s perceived best interests.  
2. Legal Services Norms 
As the prevailing business culture began to devalue the lawyer’s role as a 
counselor, lawyers themselves began to devalue that role.116  This trend found a traditional 
antecedent in the historical place of zealous advocacy in litigation.  Further, just as clients were 
succumbing to competitive pressures to focus solely on their bottom line profit, competitive 
pressures were building in the legal marketplace.  Where legal services had traditionally been 
provided by lawyers practicing in law firm settings, there was a move to pull more legal talent in 
house at businesses.117  This not only gave those in-house lawyers a more myopic view of their 
role in serving the client, but also provided businesses with sophisticated in-house legal 
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 Lavoie, supra note 40, at 169. 
115
 Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of 
the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U CHI L SCH ROUNDTABLE 381, 
381 (2001). 
116
 Id. 
  
capabilities.  This served both to decrease the revenue flowing to law firms by taking away many 
run of the mill legal questions and tasks, but also provided clients with the ability to second 
guess legal advice and take a more active role in shaping the legal advice ultimately provided by 
their outside counsel.118   
Finally, lawyers began facing competition from accountants and consulting 
groups that began hiring lawyers to provide expanded advice to their clients.119  While non-law 
advisors could not draft operative documents without running into issues regarding the 
unauthorized practice of law, they could provide sophisticated tax planning advice tailored to 
their client’s desires.  This was further exacerbated by the international operations of many 
businesses and the integration of legal and accounting functions in many international 
jurisdictions.120  Thus, tax lawyers were faced not just with competition from other law firms, but 
with competition from in-house legal functions and non-legal service providers.  This coupled 
with clients who were both less loyal to their historical outside legal counsel121 and more willing 
to take their business to the provider who would sanction their preferred interpretation of the law, 
inevitably led to a race to the bottom in legal services, where transactions were judged using the 
lowest common denominator of technical compliance with the literal terms of the law.122  
3. Judicial Norms of Statutory Interpretation 
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A related factor in attorney perceptions regarding the appropriateness of a tax 
gatekeeping role derived from the judiciary’s attitude toward tax avoidance and statutory 
interpretation.123  This factor is particularly significant since it directly contributes to the 
dynamic encouraging the previously discussed factors.  Historically the judiciary took a non-
literal approach to interpreting tax statutes and developed numerous judicial anti-abuse doctrines 
aimed at curbing overly aggressive taxpayer positions.124  Even as the courts formally endorsed 
the position that structuring transactions to minimize taxation was permissible, they typically 
would nevertheless proceed to reject the particular tax motivated transaction in the case at 
hand.125  Thus, while the law created a line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior, the 
edges of that line were often ill defined.   
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Creating a level of uncertainty regarding the exact boundaries of the law created 
an atmosphere conducive to an efficient and fair self-assessment system.  When taxpayers and 
practitioners knew that courts could be expected to reject legal positions that were based on 
unintended literal interpretations of the law or reached results at odds with the tax policy 
underlying the law, they were encouraged to be more circumspect and even-handed in their 
initial tax positions.  Taxpayers would be less inclined to view the law as merely a system of 
specific rules to be gamed by clever artifice since such attempts could be expected to fail.  
Similarly, practitioners would be on a stronger footing in dissuading a taxpayer from undertaking 
a tax motivated transaction since the likelihood of the transaction withstanding judicial scrutiny 
would be greatly reduced.  Thus, a strong judicial norm of dynamic interpretation of tax statutes 
promoted a gatekeeping function by effectively aligning the interests of both clients and 
practitioners.  Expanding the area of uncertainty regarding the exact reach of the tax law both 
made the legal constraint on overly aggressive planning more expansive and created room for 
attorneys to assert ethical considerations as relevant to navigating the zone of legal uncertainty, 
thereby allowing both ethical and legal considerations to act as constraints on aggressive 
taxpayer actions.126 
As the judiciary began to move away from this traditional approach to tax cases, it 
created uncertainty regarding how the law should be viewed and forced practitioners to directly 
face the conflict between representing their clients zealously and their role in maintaining a fair 
and efficient functioning of the self-assessment system.127  Taxpayers who saw the judiciary 
upholding the aggressive tax transactions of their competitors, felt compelled to engage in such 
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activity themselves.128  This was both a competitive necessity and a breaking down of the moral 
norm that there was an obligation to pay one’s fair share of the country’s tax burden.  By giving 
full voice to JP Morgan’s view of taxation, rather than mere lip service, the judiciary bolstered 
the emerging business focus on profits and cost benefit analysis as the only legitimate constraints 
on behavior.  In turn, such business clients had no patience for attorneys who attempted to 
dissuade desired transactions based solely on ethical or anti-abuse notions.  Lawyers not 
acceding to this new reality found themselves at a distinct disadvantage.   
Further, even lawyers who traditionally would have advised against aggressive 
transactions based on non-literal legal interpretations and anti-abuse notions had to question the 
validity of their own legal reasoning.  At its core, the job of a lawyer is to predict the future for 
his clients.  As courts muddied the water regarding how they would approach the application of 
tax statutes, the attorney’s job became much more difficult.  Even if a particular attorney 
believed a tax motivated transaction was too good to be true and he would not uphold it were he 
the judge, he would know that a judge with a more literalist disposition might well condone the 
transaction.129  How could the attorney in good conscience advise a client against a transaction 
when an identified segment of the judiciary would find the transaction perfectly legal?  Given the 
lawyer’s clear ethical duty to assist his client and the undeniable competitive pressure facing 
him, it is little wonder that even practitioners pre-disposed to undertaking a gatekeeping function 
would chose to abandon that older ethical norm as a viable standard for ongoing behavior. 
4. Decreased Societal Impetus Toward Taxpaying 
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Finally, the change in the tax bar’s view of their gatekeeping role was also 
influenced by broader changes in American society.  Historically, there was a moral component 
to taxpaying in the United States.130  While this began to give way in the 1930s131, World War II 
saw a renewed patriotic impetus toward taxpaying.132  Even after the war, the United States 
found itself locked in an ideological struggle with Communism that supported a taxpaying 
impetus on the public.133  However, as society moved beyond these periods of crisis,134 the 
viewpoint that taxation should be viewed as a purely a forced extraction of wealth from citizens 
without any moral or ethical component to the obligation began to reassert itself.135   
This period also saw a general decline in the level of respect for and trust in 
government and other institutions.136  The portion of Americans who responded that the federal 
                                                 
130
 See, e.g., JOHN S. WISE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 74 (1906) (depicting tax 
evaders as unpatriotic and faithless). 
131
 See Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax 
Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 997–1000 (2004) (discussing the changing 
judicial, legal, economic, and political views on taxation and tax avoidance that began to emerge 
in the 1920s, and the shift from moral to “amoral discourse on tax avoidance”). 
132
 See Jones, supra note 67, at 716. 
133
 Hatfield, supra note 8, at 11-13. 
134
 John R. Alford, We’re All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958-1996, 
in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth 
Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) (suggesting that in United States low level of trust in government is the 
norm and that external threats to the country cause that trust to increase temporarily). 
135
 Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a Tax Return 
Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 65-70, 78-79 (2007) (noting the decline in media 
perceptions of taxpaying obligations from strong portrayals of honest taxpayers in the 1950s and 
1960s, to mixed messages in the early 1970s, to apparent endorsements of tax cheating in the 
1990s; and linking this decline in part to societal changes over the period that have weakened 
public trust in government to tax and spend wisely). 
136
 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, LABOR 
AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND, 15 (Rev’d ed., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) 
(1983)(“the early 1960s turned out to be a high-water mark in the history of the American 
public’s attitudes toward their key social, political and economic structures.”); Anthony King, 
Distrust of Government: Explaining American Exceptionalism, in DISAFFECTED DEMOCRACIES 
74, 95 (Susan J. Pharr & Robert D. Putnam eds., 2000) (noting as causes of increased distrust of 
  
government can be trusted “to do what is right” most of the time or just about always fell from 
76% in 1964, to 30% in 2008.137  This general decline in trust has been demonstrated to have a 
direct impact on tax compliance.138  As society moved farther away from the ideal that taxpaying 
was a moral and patriotic duty, the role of tax attorneys in advising their clients shifted as well.  
Indeed, these same societal forces can be seen behind the general decline in the respect for 
attorneys generally since the mid-1960s.139 
IV. The Future of Tax Gatekeeping  
A. Whither (or Wither) Tax Gatekeeping? 
The foregoing discussion has reviewed the historical arguments for and against a 
gatekeeping norm in the tax arena and shown that a gatekeeping norm existed in the past, but has 
been largely abandoned today.  In this Part the question is:  Should we care?  And if so, what can 
be done to reinvigorate and reestablish a gatekeeping norm within the tax bar?   
This article takes the position that we should care and that it is worthwhile to 
resurrect a gatekeeping function for the tax bar.  The main rationale in support of this view is the 
same one expressed earlier in this article, that an attorney’s zealous advocacy role should and 
must be circumscribed to ensure that the self-assessment system functions properly and that 
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taxpayers continue to perceive the tax system as fair.  A breakdown in respect for the tax system 
could well lead to widespread tax avoidance and a breakdown of the stable taxpaying ethos in the 
United States.140  A strong gatekeeping norm within the tax bar can help forestall this possibility 
and promote the rule of law.   
While the historical argument that an ethical gatekeeping norm was unnecessary 
as sufficiently covered by an attorney’s general ethical obligations, has clearly been refuted by 
the waves of tax shelter activity in recent decades, the existence of that very tax shelter activity 
can be utilized to argue against continuing to assert a gatekeeping norm.141  This argument uses 
the failure of the historical gatekeeping norm to prevent past tax shelter waves as evidence that 
the traditionally articulated gatekeeping obligation was too ill-defined to serve as an enforceable 
normative guide for actual practitioner actions.142  Hence, under this argument, advocating for a 
gatekeeping function is a misguided effort that will never be able to stand up to the competitive 
pressures facing practitioners and therefore can never serve as a realistic constrain on aggressive 
taxpayer behavior.   
It is undoubtedly true that practitioners failed abysmally as gatekeepers during the 
periods of tax shelter activity in the past 40 years.  However, this observed failure is most likely 
due to the rejection by a majority of practitioners of gatekeeping as a legitimate ethical norm, 
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despite the legal academy routinely asserting during this period that a gatekeeping role existed.143  
As discussed earlier, ethical behavior is ultimately determined by the specific culture or sub-
culture creating the norm.  Merely stating that any particular norm should exist in a society is 
nonsense and attempting to impose a norm from outside, without the means and will to enforce it 
from outside as well, is an exercise in futility.144  To be effective, an ethical norm must reflect 
the consensus of those to whom it applies and be subject to effective internal enforcement.145  
While gatekeeping within the tax bar has often been proclaimed as the accepted ethical norm, at 
least since the 1965 Opinion that has never been the formal opinion of the American Bar 
Association.   
So, it is disingenuous to suggest that the tax bar should not attempt to reach a 
consensus in favor of a gatekeeping role merely because a true consensus with formal adoption 
by the bar has not existed in recent times.  The goal of this article is to propose a means by which 
the bar may be encouraged to shoulder this burden on its own initiative in a manner that will give 
both form and reality to an ethical gatekeeping norm that, in fact, has not existed in recent 
memory. 
An alternative response might be that Government actions have already 
interceded to such a degree that recognizing an ethical norm of gatekeeping is irrelevant and 
unnecessary today.  Following the Government’s recent changes to Circular 230, the civil 
penalty provisions, the codification of the economic substance doctrine and its efforts to increase 
taxpayer disclosure of questionable transactions, there is little discretion left to tax advisors to 
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promote abusive transactions or assist their clients in pursuing such schemes.146  In effect, the 
failure of the bar to come to a consensus and enforce an ethical gatekeeping norm has led the 
Government to impose the functional equivalent as a matter of law.  As proof of this fact, one 
can point to the apparent downturn in tax shelter activity in recent years.147   
Of course, if this position is correct, then the bar should have no problem formally 
adopting and embracing an ethical gatekeeping norm since it merely confirms the existing 
legally imposed reality.  Yet we see no impetus to conform the ABA’s formally announced 
standards to this supposed new reality.148  Further the nature of a legally imposed rule is that it 
will only apply in the specific circumstances covered, and we have seen how adept the tax bar 
can be in finding loopholes in structures of legally imposed rules.149  If there is no ethical 
standard to backstop the Government’s imposed rules, then there is no disincentive for attorneys 
to exploit any areas not specifically governed by the legally imposed rules.  In these gap areas 
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tax attorneys would be free to pursue the same destructive tax shelter activity that occurred in 
recent decades.   
While it may turn out that the current set of rules provides an all inclusive barrier 
to attorney participation in tax shelter activity, there is reason to be skeptical of this conclusion.  
After the amendments to Circular 230 in the 1980s and the adoption of statutory rules to curtail 
tax shelter transactions, there was a drop off in tax shelter activity for a few years before new tax 
shelter schemes arose in the 1990s.150  While the Government’s actions spelled the demise of 
certain types of tax shelters, the drop off in activity may have resulted merely from the retooling 
of the industry.  Conversely, the drop off in present day tax shelter activity may be due more to 
the fact that taxpayers have less income and gain to shelter currently as a result of the worst 
economic downturn in this country since the Great Depression.151  When the economy turns 
around in the coming years, it is likely we will see more pressure for tax shelter transactions.  
Whether the Government’s current rules will effectively contain that pressure remains to be seen. 
As a final point in favor of attempting to refine and reassert a tax gatekeeping 
norm, it should be noted that reaching consensus on such a norm can be seen as in the best long 
term interest of both the bar and clients.  The changes to Circular 230 and the penalty provisions 
in response to the tax shelter wave in the 1990s have placed significant additional burdens on 
practitioners and their clients.152  These rules clearly have put real constraints on the relationship 
between clients and their attorneys and arguably dissuade the provision of some legitimate tax 
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advice and planning.153  Should lawyer assisted tax shelter activity become rampant again in the 
future, the bar should expect the Government to impose even more draconian restrictions on 
them.  Taking concrete steps today to prevent future abuses and thereby forestalling any further 
potentially overly broad and restrictive Government intrusions into the attorney client 
relationship should be supportable as in the best interest of all involved. 
B. Creating an Accepted and Sustainable Gatekeeping Norm 
If a gatekeeping norm is desirable in the tax area, but appears to no longer exist, 
what can be done to create one anew?  Most commentators in the last few decades have 
maintained that tax practitioners do have an ethical gatekeeping obligation.154  This article has 
demonstrated that while, as a tax policy matter, such an ethical obligation should exist, and it 
appears to in fact to have existed at least for a time, the modern reality of tax shelter activity 
belies its continued existence.  The problem is that ethical rules, and for that matter even rules of 
law, are worthless if they are not truly accepted and internalized by the group governed by such 
rules.155  So, if a gatekeeping norm is desirable, merely proclaiming its existence will do little, by 
itself, to bring that norm into actual existence.  This is especially true when powerful forces, both 
internal and external to the group, push members of the group in the opposite direction.  Re-
establishing a gatekeeping norm within the tax bar requires changing the existing culture of the 
tax bar, which in turn requires altering or exploiting various elements of the broader societal 
milieu in which the tax bar operates. 
1. Reaching Consensus and Announcing a Standard 
                                                 
153
 Charles A. Rose,  Note, The Tax Lawyer’s Dilemma: Recent Developments Heighten Tax 
Lawyer Responsibilities and Liabilities, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 258, 260-62 (2011). 
154
 See supra notes 9 and 11. 
155
 Lavoie, supra note 40, at 136-38. 
  
The imposition of an ethical rule on a group does not guarantee that the rule will 
be followed.  To achieve a practical reality, the rule must be generally accepted as correct by 
those subject to it, as well as being subject to effective enforcement mechanisms to dissuade non-
compliant behavior.156  Essentially, there must be a consensus regarding the rule for it to have 
legitimacy.  Consequently, internally debated and democratically adopted norms are the ones 
most likely to be obeyed, even by those who did not originally favor the adopted norm.157  Of 
course, establishing consensus around an ethical standard is immeasurably harder when there is a 
pre-existing standard to the contrary. 
This is unfortunately the predicament facing a renewed tax gatekeeping norm.  
While the extant literature maintains practitioners have such an ethical obligation, and the 
Government informally concurs, the ABA’s pronouncements in the 1965 Opinion and the 1985 
Opinion are premised on treating tax practice as an adversarial endeavor.158  Despite the 
proliferation of tax shelter activity in the 1990s and the significant changes to Circular 230 and 
the civil penalty provisions, the ABA has not seen fit to revisit the 1985 Opinion.  Further, the 
broader legal profession has long embraced an all encompassing zealous advocacy norm that is 
only slowly changing.   
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The first step in reviving a tax gatekeeping norm is to withdraw the 1985 Opinion 
and replace it with one explicitly endorsing a gatekeeping role in tax planning.  On its face this 
presents a “which came first” problem, since announcing the new ethical norm would help 
promote consensus around it, but consensus regarding the norm is presumably an essential 
element in adopting the new norm to begin with.  However, consensus is often formed thru open 
discussion.  Even if the required consensus is presently lacking, if the ABA were to undertake a 
new study on the provision of tax advice to clients, a new consensus could well emerge from that 
dialogue.  Indeed, there are a number of changes in recent years that could be brought to bear in 
such a discussion in favor of adopting a gatekeeping norm, including, (1) the growing academic 
acceptance that restraining the zealous advocacy norm outside of (and sometimes even inside of) 
litigation is legitimate159 and (2) the reality of recent direct regulation of tax practice by the 
Government, and the risk of even more draconian Government regulation in the future if the bar 
fails to effectively self-regulate.  
Still, while beginning a real discussion of the proper role of advisors within the 
tax bar is a crucial first step if an effective gatekeeping norm is to be established, there is no 
guarantee that such discussions would result in that consensus.  Despite the fact that restraining 
its own behavior is in the best interest of the tax bar (and their clients) to avoid more 
Government regulation, powerful forces push the tax bar in the other direction.  These include, 
among others, (1) competitive pressures which force attorneys to compete for clients based on 
tax result rather than sound advice, (2) outside pressure from clients who engage in a 
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collaborative approach to obtaining legal advice, and (3) increased uncertainty regarding the 
judicial demeanor toward tax planning and statutory interpretation.  If these forces are to be 
overcome, some countervailing forces must be put in play to nudge the tax bar toward a 
gatekeeping consensus.   
2. Seizing the Power of Individual Action and Example 
Changing a cultural norm is not an easy task.  Generally such norms remain stable 
and resistant to change.  However, when change occurs, it typically does so quickly rather than 
based on a gradual shift.160  This tipping point nature of cultural norms highlights an unexpected 
vehicle for prompting rapid change, individual action.161  On its face it may seem absurd to 
assert that the actions of an individual, or a small cadre of individuals, could lead to a cultural 
change, but even small changes to a social norm can precipitate dramatic and rapid changes 
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given the right conditions.162  This insight builds on modern models of disease transmission 
where once viruses reach a critical mass they spread at an exponential rate.  Essentially, human 
behaviors can themselves be contagious.163  In this way, if even a small group of people reject an 
existing norm, others seeing their action may decide that they themselves should adopt it and 
start an informational or reputational cascade effect.164  Such snowballing effects draw their 
strength from the fact that most social groups strive for homogeneity.165  This tipping point effect 
can apply both in the context of endorsing a new social norm, as well as condemning one.166   
The same principle applies to ethical situations.  While one individual cannot 
singlehandedly change the world, he can influence those around him in ways that ultimately have 
profound consequences.167  Imagine a crowd of people gathered for a peaceful protest.  One 
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individual’s unilateral act of violence does not convert the protesters into a mob.  However, the 
way that others respond might.  If no one objects to the violence, then that sends a message to 
others in the crowd that the group finds violence acceptable, and the peaceful protest may 
quickly cascade into mayhem.  Conversely, if members of the crowd censure and act against the 
initial violence, the peaceful purpose of the group is reaffirmed and cohesion to the original norm 
is maintained.  One individual cannot unilaterally impose an ethical change on a group, but his 
example can prompt others to question their views.168  When a person takes a principled stand in 
the face of a contrary norm, the present has been changed for those around him and who knows 
what good may ultimately arise in the future as a result.   
So, this article presents a plea to practitioners to raise concerns with clients even 
when it is uncomfortable to do so.  Even if an attorney feels constrained to provide zealous 
advice to a client, they should note that there is still a moral dimension to the question as well as 
a purely legal one.  By standing up for a duty to the system and noting the harm a tax avoidance 
transaction presents to the system, the practitioner may give his client or other attorneys dealing 
with the transaction, the strength to question their own views about the appropriateness of their 
actions, even if technically legal.  By doing so, the attorney not only impacts the group dynamic 
within the business ethics context, but serves as an example that can serve as the tipping point for 
other tax lawyers to question the true ethical norms in play.  This is not to say that speaking out 
is easy, as it may cause risks for those who do it, but the more it is done the better.   
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Further, outside specific client settings, it is especially important that high profile 
tax practitioners and academics take up the cause and publically advocate for a strong 
gatekeeping norm since these trend setters will have an outsized impact on the behavior of 
others.169  Consequently, anything that can be done to make it easier for an attorney to follow 
their conscience should be done to promote individual action and the importance of individual 
action should not be easily dismissed.  
3. Encouraging Gatekeeping  
Hastening a consensus regarding tax gatekeeping will require the creation of 
incentives for individual attorneys, and the bar as a whole, to willingly assume a gatekeeping 
function.170  One means of achieving this is to appeal to their self-interest.  As discussed earlier, 
one element of self-interest, avoiding future Government regulation of the profession, is already 
present.  However, other factors discourage attorneys from counseling clients against aggressive 
                                                 
169
 Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2010), 
noting: 
But oftentimes change is only possible through the facilitation of 
specific types of individuals, variously known as “change agents,” 
“opinion leaders,” and “norm entrepreneurs,” whose native 
abilities and social positions can encourage others to adopt a new 
norm.  They may have extensive and diverse personal relationships 
that allow the rapid spread of new ideas. They may have 
knowledge about a vast array of issues or a technical expertise that 
gives credibility to the information and opinions they provide. 
They may be especially convincing in their arguments and possess 
a high “social intelligence” that lets them recognize the value of 
change. Or they may have a combination of these and other 
attributes. 
170
 Of course, internal motivations are also important.  So, one’s internal self-image may be 
linked to being an honest person and acting ethically in all their affairs.  Consequently, the 
importance of general indoctrination into the ethical nature of gatekeeping should not be 
overlooked.  For instance, tax LL.M programs might consider making a tax ethics course a 
required element of their degree.  Currently, only one (Boston University) of the top six tax 
LL.M programs (New York University, Georgetown University, University of Florida, 
Northwestern University, Boston University, Miami University) make ethics a required course. 
  
positions; including a fear that raising concern about technically legal transactions would result 
in losing that client’s future business.  To change this dynamic, it is necessary to (1) create a 
conflict of interest that requires attorneys to raise the broader ethical considerations despite 
general business distain for such considerations, and/or (2) change the prevailing business norms 
to be more receptive to considerations other than profit maximization and strict legal compliance.   
One way of creating such a conflict of interest would be for the Government to 
pursue a more public and targeted enforcement effort on the clients of practitioners who advised 
on an aggressive transaction in the past.  This would have a two pronged effect.  When advising 
a particular client who is seeking aggressive advice, the practitioner would need to consider not 
only the interests of the current client, but the interests of his other clients and his own future 
livelihood.  If being overly zealous for one client puts other clients at higher risk for audit, then 
that conflict of interest could prompt the attorney to temper his advice.  Further, acceding to the 
aggressive advice desired by a client would potentially jeopardize the attorney’s future earnings 
since other clients would be less inclined to hire a representative who would draw heightened 
scrutiny to them.  Indeed, such publicized enforcement activity can help reduce the competitive 
pressures that lead to a legal race to the bottom.  A taxpayer who knows that aggressive tax 
planners serve as audit lightning rods have an incentive to seek out practitioners who have a 
good reputation with the Government (and presumably are more even handed in their legal 
conclusions).171   
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The Government could also take a more direct approach to intentionally create 
conflicts of interest between tax lawyers and their clients.  For instance, the Government could 
modify the attorney-client privilege in tax situations or override normal client confidentiality 
rules by legally requiring certain disclosures to the Government of specified client actions.172  
Indeed, in promulgating regulations dealing with the disclosure of certain reportable transactions, 
the Government, perhaps inadvertently, created just such a conflict of interest.173  Of course at 
the extreme the Government could potentially eliminate all privilege or confidentiality for tax 
planning matters and then even require practitioners to report aggressive client activity.174  But 
this is exactly the type of Government interference with the profession that everyone would 
agree would be detrimental to all involved.  However, Government actions touching on these 
matters at the margins could be effective in both encouraging attorneys to generally distance 
their legal considerations from their client’s business goals and highlight in a tangible way the 
real risk to the tax bar associated with a continued unwillingness to effectively self-regulate.   
As discussed in the next section, the other way to encourage attorneys to question 
the advisability of aggressive but arguably legal transactions is to make such considerations more 
germane to the clients being served by the attorney and thereby relieve some of the outside 
pressures acting to suppress a gatekeeping function.  
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4. Relieving the Anti-Gatekeeping Pressure 
A primary reason tax lawyers hesitate to raise issues regarding aggressive tax 
planning is that their clients are unlikely to be receptive to such “non-legal” advice coming from 
their legal advisors.175  Businesses in the United States are focused primarily on their bottom line 
and consequently view the law as merely a system of rules to be gamed for the sole goal of profit 
maximization.176  Under this approach, as long as a transaction is technically “legal” then it 
should be pursued to obtain the expected economic benefit irrespective of any non-financial 
considerations.177  This is compounded by the conventional wisdom that taxpaying is an area of 
purely legal inquiry, devoid of any moral considerations178 and by general societal trends that 
weaken the taxpaying norm.179  A lawyer’s ability to counsel against this approach to applying 
the tax laws is made almost impossibly difficult when the judiciary actually endorses such a 
literalistic approach to interpreting the tax laws.180  Given the uncertainty today regarding 
judicial attitudes, a lawyer may be hard pressed to refuse to advise against an aggressive 
transaction where a literalist court may well uphold the transaction.  Consequently, clarifying the 
proper method of statutory interpretation in tax cases is absolutely crucial to reestablishing a tax 
gatekeeping norm.181  While recent court decisions have moved back toward traditional anti-
abuse notions in scrutinizing tax motivated transactions, the underlying schism within the 
judiciary and the academy regarding the interpretation of statutes remains.182  While the 
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Government has taken an important step toward clarifying this matter by codifying the economic 
substance doctrine, more should be done to solidify judicial approaches in this area and thereby 
reduce the uncertainty for practitioners in predicting the likely judicial response to an aggressive 
transaction.  There are several mechanisms by which this could be done.  First, a general anti-
abuse rule could be statutorily adopted.183  This has been done in several countries with generally 
positive effect, despite practitioner criticism.184  Alternatively, given the long history of 
judicially created anti-abuse doctrines in the United States, a simpler approach would be to 
merely statutorily reaffirm the appropriateness of courts continuing to apply such doctrines and 
to eschew literal interpretations of the Code that are at odds with the intended purpose and scope 
of the subject provisions.185   
Another approach for making businesses more receptive to cautionary advice 
from their attorneys would be to alter the business culture of their clients using public censure.186  
In the past, public outcry over corporations expatriating to avoid US taxes was brought to bear to 
question, or try to reverse, a number of such transactions.187  Today many corporations pay very 
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low effective tax rates.188  Publicizing such rates might well create a public outcry demanding 
that corporate citizens pay their fair share of the tax burden as well.189   
V. Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that the tax bar’s failure to effectively constrain its 
actions on behalf of clients has forced the Government to impose constraints on the tax bar 
through direct regulation.  As has happened with securities lawyers, this direct Government 
regulation could become even more onerous if the tax bar fails to embrace a strong gatekeeping 
function on its own.  In order to preserve the traditional and important tax planning role of 
attorneys in business and personal planning situations, the bar must be willing to curb its support 
for aggressive tax planning techniques.  While this will require a departure from traditional 
notions that every client must be represented zealously without consideration of ancillary adverse 
consequences to society or third parties (including the attorney himself), it is in line with both the 
historical approach to practicing tax law and emerging trends arguing in favor of a general 
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obligation of attorneys to counterbalance their zealous advocacy for a client against a duty to 
support and strengthen the substantive body of law in which they practice.   
The tax bar should begin a forthright discussion of these issues immediately, with 
the goal of reaching a strong consensus in favor of adopting a formal ethical gatekeeping norm.  
Achieving this consensus will require weakening the competitive and other forces which align 
attorneys too closely with a client’s profit maximization goals, but with sufficient resolve on the 
part of a cadre of attorneys who see the stakes involved, these forces can be overcome. 
Looking beyond the tax bar, the implications of how the degradation of a 
gatekeeping norm in the tax area has impacted tax practitioners should serve as a warning to all 
lawyers to heed calls for a gatekeeping function in their particular fields.  While historically it 
has been argued that the tax field is unique in this regard due to the self-assessment nature of the 
income tax, that uniqueness is less true today.  As the United States moves ever closer to a 
regulatory state where more and more individual and business action is circumscribed by 
detailed statutory and regulatory frameworks, attorneys will be increasingly called on to promote 
adherence to these rules.  A zealous advocacy norm will promote game playing with these 
frameworks and ultimately harm the rule of law.  Additionally, many of the forces described 
herein that have caused tax practitioners to eschew their historical gatekeeping function find 
direct analogues in other practice areas.  The tax experience provides a cautionary tale for the 
entire bar on the importance of affirmatively embracing a gatekeeping function as a means of 
saving a zealous advocacy norm that otherwise could be completely swept away. 
